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held tide to the storage water rights. The court then examined the
findings of fact of the 1936 decree. In the findings of fact, the decree
assigned the same dollar value per acre-foot of storage water in the
reservoir for each subdivision of land, regardless of its distance from the
reservoir, implied the use of the universal shrink method. The findings
of fact also addressed the issue of deducting conveyance loss, but did
not provide a required method for dividing those losses. Therefore, the
court found that the findings of fact and the 1936 decree more likely
pointed to the use of the universal shrink method of apportioning
conveyance losses.
Further, the court held that the universal shrink method of
apportioning conveyance losses was lawful. In doing so, the court
found that Rule 40.03.b, requiring the Idaho Department of Water
Resources' watermaster to apportion conveyance losses according to
water reach, only applied to appropriators of water. The court also
examined previous cases and determined that the implementation of
the universal shrink method was in accordance with existing case law.
The court emphasized that the legislature intended irrigation districts
to benefit all landowners equally, and that assessments placed on the
landowners by an irrigation district cannot vary according to river
reach.
Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district coiirt.
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INDIANA
Long v. IVC Indust. Coatings, Inc., 908 N.E.2d 697 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)
(holding that (1) whether water travelling through ditches was surface
water and (2) whether water containing mud ceased to be surface water
were genuine issues of material fact which preclude summary
judgment).
David and Connie Long ("Longs") and IVC Industrial Coatings, Inc.
("IC") owned property on opposite sides of a county road. The Longs
constructed two farm ponds between 10 and 20 feet deep at various
parts on the property, which the Longs stocked with fish. Before 2001,
IVC's property was a field. Rain falling on the field would drain
through an established course and eventually move to a culvert
travelling under the road between the properties and into the Long's
farm ponds. Beginning in 2001, IVC began improving its property and
hired contractors to begin construction on a manufacturing facility,
including a significant amount of earthwork resulting in a "rather large
mound of earth" on the side of the property nearest the road.
During that time and continuing into 2002, rain caused mud, silt,
and sediment to run off the mound, to the culvert, and eventually into
the Long's ponds, causing deposits that made the ponds muddy and
unfishable, and significantly decreasing their depth. In January 2002,
Dale Walker, an employee of the Indiana State Department of
Agriculture, issued an evaluation report indicating there was evidence
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that sedimentation from IVC's construction was leaving the site and that
sediment control was not in compliance with Ind. Admin. Code 15-5.
This section of the code governs construction related storm water runoff.
At the beginning of 2003, the Longs filed a compliant against IVC
and its contractors claiming negligence and that the sediment runoff
constituted a nuisance and trespass. IVC and the contractors filed
motions for summary judgment, which the Clay Superior Court
granted. -In its order, the trial court found that the common enemy
doctrine of water diversion applied to this case and that the Longs had
no cause of action because there was no genuine factual issue for
submission to a jury regarding whether the water depositing mud on
their property was surface water or water in a natural watercourse. The
Longs appealed to the Indiana Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial
court erred in granting summary judgment to VC/Contractors and in
applying the common enemy doctrine.
On appeal, the Longs first argued that the water was not surface
water, but rather followed a natural watercourse. Additionally, the
Longs claimed that the common enemy doctrine did not apply because
the water contained mud, silt, and sediment.. The court began its
analysis by restating the definition of surface water as water "following
no defined course or channel." Under the common enemy doctrine, a
landowner can divert or contain surface water as he or she sees fit, even
if the method of control affects an adjacent property. In addition, the
court noted that the application of the common enemy doctrine
precludes a plaintiff's action regardless of whether the plaintiff asserts
the claim as negligence, trespass or a nuisance.
The doctrine does not apply, however, to water running in a natural
watercourse. Water establishes a natural watercourse when it begins to
flow in a definite and specific course. Several factors are essential to
designating a watercourse including substantial existence, regularity,
and dependability of water flow along a specific course. The court
recalled that the constant water flow is not necessary and the size of the
watercourse does not matter in making a watercourse determination.
Therefore, the court concluded there was a possibility that a jury could
determine that the flow of water from IVC's property to the Longs'
property followed a natural watercourse, making summary judgment on
the issue inappropriate.
The Longs also argued that the common enemy doctrine did not
apply because the water contained mud, silt, and sediment. The court
determined that mud and sediment in the water does not preclude the
application of the common enemy doctrine. The court reasserted that
application of the common enemy doctrine relies on determining
whether the water is surface water or water following a natural
watercourse. However, the court did conclude that the point at which
water ceases to be surface water and becomes a pollutant due to its
concentration of mud and sediment is a question of fact. Therefore,
the court concluded that summary judgment was not appropriate on
this issue either.
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Accordingly, the Indiana Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's
grant of summary judgment finding that there were genuine issues of
material fact the trial court needed to determine. Thus, the court
remanded the case for further proceedings.
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NEW MEXICO
Lion's Gate Water v. D'Antonio, No. 31279, 2009 WL 5124536 (N.M.
Dec. 2, 2009) (holding that de novo review of a State Engineer's
decision that water is unavailable to appropriate limits a district court's
review to that sole, dispositive issue and that the statutory provision
requiring the State Engineer to order notice publication applies only
when water is available for appropriation).
In February 2003, Lion's Gate Water ("Lion's Gate") applied for a
permit with the Water Rights Division of the Office of the State
Engineer ("Water Rights Division") to appropriate new water from the
Gila River located in southwestern New Mexico. The Water Rights
Division summarily rejected Lion's Gate's application, concluding that
there was no water available for appropriation. Finding no water
available, the Water Rights Division did not answer the ancillary
questions of whether the proposed appropriation was contrary to the
conservation of water or whether the appropriation would be
detrimental to the public welfare. Lion's Gate subsequently filed seven
additional applications; the Water Rights Division rejected all of them.
Despite the rejected applications, Lion's Gate twice attempted, though
only once succeeded, to publish notice of its application for a permit.
According to New Mexico law, the State Engineer issues all permits.
Because of the statutory hearing prerequisite to an appeal, Lion's Gate
demanded an administrative hearing to review the State Engineer's
decision to reject Lion's Gate's amended applications. Before the
required hearing, however, Lion's Gate appealed its all of its initial and
subsequent rejected applications to the Sixth Judicial District Court (the
"district court").
The district court dismissed Lion's Gate's appeals for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies because the hearing required by
statute was still pending. A year later, the State Engineer ordered a
hearing on the sole issue of whether water was available for
appropriation. Lion's Gate then filed an additional appeal in the
district court arguing that a limited hearing denied Lion's Gate the
constitutional right to fair and unbiased treatment. The district court
once again found no statutory basis for appeal before completion of the
required hearing. In August 2007, the hearing examiner granted the
Water Rights Division's motion for summary judgment because no
water was available to appropriate. Lion's Gate appealed the State
Engineer's summary judgment to the district court and requested
confirmation that the district court would hear the appeal as an original
case, including the issues the State Engineer did not consider. The

